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Abstract 
Stakeholders play an increasingly active role in private governance, including development of 
standards for measuring sustainability. Building on prior studies focused on standards and 
stakeholder engagement, we use an innovation management theoretical lens to compare 
stakeholder engagement and standards developed in two carbon markets: the Climate Action 
Reserve (CAR) and the U.N.’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). We develop and test 
hypotheses regarding how different processes of stakeholder engagement in standard 
development impact the number, identity, and age of stakeholders involved, as well as the 
variation and quality of the resulting standards. In doing so we contribute to the growing 
literature on stakeholder engagement in developing sustainability standards. (107 words) 
Keywords: Sustainability standards, inclusivity, stakeholder engagement, carbon markets, 
crowdsourcing 
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INTRODUCTION 
Researchers are increasingly attending to the societal impact of market-based 
organizations (Husted, 2003; Millar & Hall, 2013). Despite the existence of questionable 
practices (Delmas & Burbano, 2011; Furrer, Hamprecht, & Hoffmann, 2012), researchers and 
practitioners alike seem optimistic that organizations can find innovative ways to both create and 
measure value for stakeholders (Kroeger & Weber, 2014). Indeed, crucial to progress in creating 
more stakeholder value is developing sustainability standards. Understanding voluntary social 
and environmental sustainability standards is important to a number of academic fields including 
environmental studies (Sprengel & Busch, 2011; Truffer, Markard, & Wüstenhagen, 2001), 
management (Delmas & Pekovic, 2013; Dowell, Hart, & Yeung, 2000), and business ethics 
(Aguilera-Caracuel, Aragón-Correa, Hurtado-Torres, & Rugman, 2012). Prior work has 
addressed such topics as the formation (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012), diffusion (Berkhout & 
Rowlands, 2007; Corbett & Kirsch, 2001), and impact (Delmas & Montes-Sancho, 2010) of 
these voluntary sustainability standards.  
Research has also begun to explore the role of stakeholders themselves in the 
development of such standards. This research has found, broadly speaking, that effective 
stakeholder involvement in development of sustainability standards can contribute “effective 
consensus building, knowledge sharing, interest representation, and the achievement of 
legitimacy” (Balzarova & Castka, 2012). Other findings explain how the type and extent of 
stakeholder engagement can influence the outcomes of the standards-development process 
(Ponte, 2014). While this research has helped to broaden our understanding of stakeholder 
involvement in the development of sustainability standards, many prior studies rely solely on 
case-based qualitative evidence or theoretical arguments (Dolan & Opondo, 2005; Forrer & Mo, 
2013; Fransen & Kolk, 2007). Less research has used quantitative empirical data to explore 
whether and how various processes of stakeholder engagement can influence which stakeholders 
are likely to be engaged in standard development, and the degree to which those sustainability 
standards are adopted. Additionally, although prior research has acknowledged that inclusivity in 
stakeholder engagement can vary across standards-development processes (Baumann-Pauly, 
Nolan, van Heerden, & Samway, 2016; Fransen & Kolk, 2007), prior research has not 
adequately developed theory for describing stakeholder engagement processes for development 
of sustainability standards.  
We seek to address these limitations by applying concepts from innovation management 
research to explain configurations of stakeholder involvement in two prominent carbon markets: 
the California-based Climate Action Reserve (akin to a closed source process) and the United 
Nations’ Clean Development Mechanism (akin to a crowdsourced process).  In doing so we also 
answer recent calls for a shift in focus toward process-based questions in sustainability research 
(Zollo, Cennamo, & Neumann, 2013). Using such hand-gathered data from two different 
contexts allows us to more clearly isolate the tradeoffs of various stakeholder engagement 
choices in the development of sustainability standards.  
This paper proceeds as follows: First, we review the literature on stakeholder 
involvement in the development of sustainability standards. We then build on that literature to 
develop a set of testable hypotheses which explore how the process used for achieving 
stakeholder engagement affects 1) the involvement of various stakeholder groups, and 2) the 
adoption of the standards. Using data on over 500 unique sustainability standards developed 
within carbon markets, we then undertake a preliminary empirical test of our hypotheses. Finally, 
we conclude with a discussion of limitations, implications and future directions for research. 
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The role of stakeholders in organizational activity is a longstanding research topic. 
Broadly conceptualized as a constituency worthy of firms’ attention (Dawkins, 2014; de Graaf, 
2016; Freeman, 2010), stakeholders have been identified in other scholarship as playing several 
different roles (Bingham, Nabatchi, & O’Leary, 2005; Cook, 2014), and stakeholder involvement 
in organizational activities is often referred to as stakeholder engagement (Greenwood, 2007). 
Stakeholders can play a particular role in developing and proliferating sustainability standards 
(Grushina, 2016; O’Dwyer & Owen, 2007). A sustainability standard  is defined a set of 
“voluntary predefined rules, procedures, and methods to systematically assess, measure, audit 
and/or communicate … social and environmental behavior” (Gilbert, Rasche, & Waddock, 
2011). The assessment, measurement, and communication made possible by sustainability 
standards contribute to the ultimate objective of leading (directly or indirectly) to improved 
levels of sustainability at both individual and collective levels of analysis.. Consequently, the 
effective engagement of stakeholders is a key element of developing sustainability standards 
(Balzarova & Castka, 2012), especially for complex problems such as climate change 
(Tompkins, Few, & Brown, 2008). Indeed, the failure to effectively engage stakeholders can 
effectively doom the ultimate objectives of a sustainability initiative or standard (Hoque, Clarke, 
& Huang, 2016).  
In this paper we focus broadly on the engagement of stakeholders in developing 
sustainability standards. The literature on the role of stakeholders in sustainability standards has 
addressed such questions as how stakeholders can influence the formation (Botzem & Dobusch, 
2012), diffusion (Berkhout & Rowlands, 2007; Corbett & Kirsch, 2001), and impact (Delmas & 
Montes-Sancho, 2010) of sustainability standards. Whether referred to as non-state certification 
(Auld & Gulbrandsen, 2010), multi-stakeholder initiatives (Fransen & Kolk, 2007), sustainability 
assurance (Grushina, 2016), or sustainability standards (Reinecke, Manning, & Von Hagen, 
2012), prior work underscores the importance of stakeholder engagement in measuring firms’ 
pursuit of sustainable outcomes.  
For example, a study of global multi-stakeholder standard-setting articulates four types of 
NGO power observed in the development and enforcement of international standards (Boström 
& Hallström, 2010). Research also indicates that involvement of employees in environmental 
planning tends to improve the quality of a firm’s sustainability planning and performance 
(Aragón-Correa, Martín-Tapia, & Hurtado-Torres, 2013). Despite the potential for stakeholder 
contribution to better assessing, measuring, auditing and communicating sustainability, 
corporations and standard-setting organizations may not always make optimal choices regarding 
the number and type of stakeholder groups consulted for a sustainability standard or report 
(Hoque et al., 2016). One study points out that although indigenous populations are perhaps the 
most important stakeholder group related to biodiversity, fewer than 10% of sustainability 
initiative reports analyzed mentioned any involvement of indigenous groups in the development 
or evaluation of sustainability efforts (Boiral & Heras-Saizarbitoria, 2015). In addition to the 
inclusion (or exclusion) of important key groups, stakeholder engagement in sustainability 
reporting and standard-development can also vary greatly  in the number, identity, and role of the 
participating stakeholders (Fransen & Kolk, 2007; Manetti, 2011; Ponte, 2014), which can 
impact the perceived  legitimacy of the underlying report or standard (Baumann-Pauly et al., 
2016).  
Stakeholder Engagement in Developing Sustainability Standards  
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In this paper, we focus specifically on the different ways in which stakeholders are engaged in 
the development of sustainability standards. The typical approach for developing rules and 
standards involves a system in which a standard-setting organization (e.g. a government agency 
or other rating agency) both determines policy objectives and develops the appropriate standards. 
A slight variation on the typical top-down system outsources the regulatory role to the private 
sector (Delmas & Marcus, 2004; King, Lenox, & Terlaak, 2005; Majumdar & Marcus, 2001). 
The development of third party standards such as fair trade standards (Jaffee, 2010; Karjalainen 
& Moxham, 2013), Forest Stewardship Council certification (Schepers, 2010), and the Global 
Reporting Initiative (Vigneau, Humphreys, & Moon, 2014) also follow a similar top-down, 
consensus-based process. In each case, the standard-setting organization may choose to involve 
other organizations in standard development.  
We draw on concepts from innovation management research to describe the process of 
developing sustainability standards. Innovation management literature has identified different 
ways that organizations initiate the innovation process in contexts such as software development, 
medical research, and cell phone technology development (Franzoni & Sauermann, 2014; 
Mollick, 2016).  The initiating organization, from whose perspective the innovation process is 
commonly viewed, can arrange the process in a number of ways, including crowdsourced or 
closed source configurations. Closed sourcing refers to a process in which the actor initiating the 
innovation process either completes the innovation task internally, or contracts it to a designated 
supplier. The process is closed source, in that the innovation comes from a limited set of 
innovators. For example, if an organization seeks to develop software, a closed source 
development process is accomplished either directly by the firm or a contracted third-party. In 
contrast, innovation management research uses the term crowdsourcing to describe “outsourcing 
a task to a ‘crowd,’ rather than to a designated ‘agent’ (an organization, informal or formal team, 
or individual)” (Afuah & Tucci, 2012). In crowdsourced innovation, innovation tasks are sourced 
from a crowd, which may include those of unknown identity. For example, an organization 
seeking to develop new software could solicit the development of different parts of the code 
from any software coder anywhere in the world. 
In the context of closed-source standard development, the set of stakeholders that are 
engaged in the development process are first chosen by the standard-setting organization, who 
invites a group of stakeholders (e.g. industry, non-profit, university and government officials) to 
assist in developing the sustainability standard.1 After the closed set of stakeholders is 
determined, the standard is developed. The number of stakeholders who can physically meet 
together, reach a consensus, and negotiate is usually limited, but these stakeholders provide 
needed knowledge to create effective standards (Weimer, 2006).  
Crowdsourced standard development addresses the balance between access to knowledge 
and legitimacy in a different way. Crowdsourcing allows broad informational search (Jeppesen 
& Lakhani, 2010) and is used in an increasing numbers of contexts to solicit solutions from the 
“crowd” of interested stakeholders. Crowdsourcing allows multiple individuals, with 
heterogeneous capabilities and knowledge, to simultaneously create different approaches to 
accomplishing a task (Afuah & Tucci, 2012), which are then reviewed by the standard-setting 
organization to select those that meet the objectives of the standard. When applied to 
development of sustainability standards, crowdsourcing reduces the need for interaction between 
different stakeholders that seek to be involved in standard development. The Internet allows 
anyone in the world to feasibly contribute to developing a potential standard (Coglianese, 2004). 
While anyone could be involved in a crowdsourced standard development process, the 
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stakeholder participants (e.g. industry, non-profit, university and government officials) are likely 
to be similar to those participating in closed source development of sustainability standards. The 
key difference is that rather than the standard-setting organization selecting which stakeholders 
will be engaged, the stakeholders self-select into the process.  
In order for standards to gain widespread acceptance, they must be perceived to be 
developed in a legitimate manner. Closed source and crowdsourced standard development 
processes gain perceived legitimacy in different ways. In a closed source process, since the 
standard setter chooses who will develop the standard, the standard setter may be subject to 
criticism for developing standards that privilege one way of thinking or particular interests 
(Hachez & Wouters, 2011). The perceived legitimacy of the closed source standard development 
process is fostered by involving various stakeholders that are perceived to have a legitimate 
interest in developing the standard and requiring that these stakeholders come to a consensus 
(Marpet, 1998). In contrast, the perceived legitimacy of a crowdsourced standard development 
process flows from the freedom of stakeholders to participate in developing the standards. The 
ability of any stakeholder to opt-in to participate in the standard development process can be 
viewed as one form of freedom of participation (Rothschild-Whitt, 1979; Sen, 1999). Thus, the 
perceived legitimacy of a crowdsourced standard development process rests on whether any 
given stakeholder can freely engage in the standard development process. 
We summarize key differences between closed source and crowdsourced standard 
development processes in Table 1 below. We then illustrate these differences in two carbon 
offset market contexts. Subsequently, we derive hypotheses illustrating the consequences of the 
differences between these two processes. 
--- INSERT TABLE 1 HERE --- 
 
 
Carbon Markets – An Illustrative Research Setting  
Scientists widely agree that GHG emissions may lead to climate change and other catastrophic 
consequences (Pielke Jr & Oreskes, 2005) including extinction of species (Thomas et al., 2004), 
increase in natural disasters (Schiermeier, 2011), and population displacements (Sherbinin et al., 
2011). Multiple separate carbon systems or markets have been set up to achieve a mix of 
stakeholder objectives associated with searching for new and more effective ways to create 
emission reductions (Grubb, 2003). There are many gases that cause climate disruption (e.g. 
carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide), each with different effects, lifetimes, and marginal 
abatement costs (Manne & Richels, 2001). Emission reductions can come from almost any 
industrial activity including agriculture, energy production, transportation, and manufacturing 
(Baumert, Herzog, & Pershing, 2005). Thus, carbon markets provide a context to observe the 
development of multiple carbon offset measurement standards. Each of these standards is a 
specific type of sustainability standard that quantifies greenhouse gas reductions (an important 
sustainability-related outcome) under specific industrial conditions. The carbon offsets created in 
carbon markets are tied to emission reductions, which are essentially public goods that only have 
market value if the standards by which they are created, and the process by which the standards 
are developed are considered to be highly legitimate. We gain insight into the process of 
stakeholder engagement in the development of sustainability standards in carbon offset markets 
because stakeholders are engaged in the development of a large number of carbon offset 
measurement standards in different ways across carbon markets. 
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In a carbon market, a buyer purchases a document certifying that a specified quantity of 
GHG emissions has been reduced. In other words a sustainability-related outcome has been 
created. The evaluative criterion is one of impact, not process. Sustainability standards must be 
developed first to define, measure, and monitor reductions relative to hypothetical scenarios 
(counterfactuals) in which emission reduction systems have not been introduced (Wara & Victor, 
2008). Carbon offsets produced by different organizations, in different locations, and at different 
times are considered as equivalent if they are developed using the measurement standards of the 
carbon market. Offsets can be sold like other financial instruments, thus allowing sustainability 
outcomes to be exchanged for financial reward.  
We rely on observations of two carbon markets to discuss the tradeoffs involved in two 
different approaches (we use the terms closed-source and crowdsourced from innovation 
management research) for developing carbon offset standards, which are one type of 
sustainability standard, though our observations are applicable to the development of 
sustainability standards more broadly. The first carbon market, which started in 2001 as a 
component of the United Nations’ Kyoto Protocol (Michaelowa & Jotzo, 2005), is the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM). The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (“UNFCCC”) is the standard-setting organization in the CDM. The CDM is also the 
largest and most noted carbon market. Similarly, the Climate Action Reserve (CAR), was 
established in 2001 to provide a voluntary system by which North American companies could 
cost-effectively meet greenhouse gas emission goals in anticipation of future climate change 
legislation (“Climate Action Reserve,” 2011). Below we explain the key differences in the way 
that CDM and CAR designed systems quantify GHG emission reductions. We provide key 
points of comparison between the two systems for context in Table 2. These key differences have 
implications for other attempts at developing sustainability standards.  
--- INSERT TABLE 2 HERE --- 
The carbon offset standards in both carbon markets are used to measure sustainability 
improvements, based on the basic principle of additionality. Additionality refers to outcomes that 
would not have happened without the focal intervention (Greiner & Michaelowa, 2003). 
Additionality is the formal concept that underlies the assumption that actions cause outcomes. If 
emission reductions would have happened without a specific emission-related project, the 
intervention did not cause emission reductions, and it makes little sense to create a financial 
instrument tied to these reductions. While there are several potential avenues by which to 
establish additionality, both carbon markets require detailed comparison of a proposed project to 
a counterfactual scenario (describing what would have happened) (Bumpus & Man, 2009). The 
logic underlying the need for additionality diverges from logics that often prevail in research and 
practice in the social sector. From the inception of carbon markets, opportunism and fraud were 
considered potential issues, and thus considered when designing the systems for measuring 
emission reductions (Lovell, 2010).  
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Crowdsourced versus Closed Source Development of Standards 
We move now to deriving hypotheses based on the differences between closed source and 
crowdsourced stakeholder engagement in standard development, as represented in CAR and 
CDM. We begin with CAR, which has a measurement standard development process that is 
largely controlled by the standard setting organization, also named CAR. A small number of 
CAR employees search for and screen projects that have good potential for development of a 
new carbon offset measurement standard (called “protocol” by CAR)2. These staff members (or 
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their outside consultants) develop an ‘issue paper’ to determine if an appropriate performance 
standard can be developed for a particular project type. This determination includes assessment 
of technical feasibility (whether a performance standard is possible) and market feasibility 
(whether there are a sufficient number of projects that could use the measure). If the issue paper 
indicates that a measurement standard would be feasible, CAR staff invites a group of 
stakeholders, including industry experts, academics, industry associations, non-profit 
organizations, university and governmental bodies to join a working group to draft the standard 
(Levin, 2011)3. These stakeholders create a draft version and strive for full consensus among 
members of the group. However, CAR staff members make the final decision when members of 
the working group disagree on the details of the carbon offset measurement standard. The draft is 
posted on the CAR website for public comment, and finally presented to the CAR board for 
approval. Once a measurement standard receives final approval, carbon offset project owners 
may follow it to generate carbon offsets in the CAR system.  
We label this process as a closed source process of developing sustainability standards, 
similar to the “consultation” approach to multi-stakeholder initiatives identified in prior work 
(Fransen & Kolk, 2007). For each specific standard, the CAR process starts with initial search 
efforts of the regulatory agency and the members of the cross-sectoral working group. While 
CAR accepts recommendations regarding potential standards from the public, these 
recommendations are treated only as helpful advice (Climate Action Reserve, 2010). The CAR 
standard development process is largely complete before the public comment period, which 
limits public influence (Levin, 2011).  
In contrast, the UNFCCC follows a crowdsourced process for creating carbon offset 
measurement standards (called “methodologies” in the CDM). The UNFCCC invites any 
stakeholder (e.g. for-profit firms, non-profits, university, national government agencies) to 
propose standards that could be used to quantify and monitor greenhouse gas emission 
reductions produced by a project of particular type. Instead of choosing one “winner,” the 
UNFCCC allows multiple approved methodologies, each adapted to one of the many different 
industrial contexts in which greenhouse gases are emitted. No one owns these measurement 
standards. If approved by the UNFCCC, the measurement standard is incorporated within the 
CDM, and can freely be applied by others to develop and quantify emission reductions for future 
projects. Just as new technological innovations build on prior ones, new CDM methodologies 
can reference, copy, or imitate parts of prior approved measurement standards, so stakeholders 
do not have to create standards from scratch. Each approved standard is one more specific 
standard for measuring greenhouse gas emissions in the CDM.4 In some cases, standards that are 
similar are combined to avoid confusion. Unlike solicitations for public comment that are 
common in the more typical closed source standard creation process that develop partial 
solutions, the CDM standard development process requires the development and submission of 
fully-formed standards. Therefore, the scope and direction of standard development in this 
system is largely determined by stakeholders who are willing to develop a complete individual 
standard, subject to the approval of the standard-setting organization.  
 
Trade-offs in Engagement Patterns 
We first consider how closed source and crowdsourced standard development processes differ in 
terms of which stakeholders are involved. We focus our arguments on tradeoffs between 
accessing requisite knowledge and maintaining a perception of legitimacy of the development 
process Below we identify how and why these tradeoffs can influence which stakeholders are 
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engaged in developing sustainability standards. While we discuss differences between these 
processes for stakeholder engagement in carbon offset markets, our unit of analysis is the 
individual carbon offset measurement standards, rather than the carbon offset market, which 
allows for comparison between carbon offset markets of different scales.  
A closed-source process of standard development requires a standard-setting organization 
to select stakeholders to help develop the standard. The standard-setting organization may select 
a different pool of stakeholders for each standard that is developed. As mentioned previously, the 
perceived legitimacy of a closed source standard development process is tied to the legitimacy of 
selection of stakeholders engaged in the process. A standard-setting organization can increase 
perceptions of legitimacy in a few ways. Typically, these involve improving the inclusivity or 
transparency of the standard development process (Auld & Gulbrandsen, 2010; Fransen & Kolk, 
2007; Ponte, 2014). First, standard-setting organizations can involve stakeholders that are 
generally seen as more legitimate in the context of sustainability. For example, stakeholders from 
the government or non-profit sectors are widely believed to have interests that are better aligned 
with the public good and long-term sustainability. Second, to improve perceptions of legitimacy 
of the process, a standard-setting organization in a closed source process can involve multiple 
perspectives from various stakeholders so that the resulting standard is viewed as representing 
not just one interest, but multiple interests (Balzarova & Castka, 2012; Baumann-Pauly et al., 
2016). And finally, perceptions of legitimacy of the process of developing sustainability 
standards can be improved by involving stakeholders from multiple sectors, such that the 
standard is viewed as the result of cross-sector collaboration (Crosby & Bryson, 2010). While 
involving multiple stakeholders in developing a particular standard can spread the costs of 
development over a larger number of stakeholders, it also potentially creates coordination issues. 
The standard-setting organization typically bears these coordinating costs in a closed source 
process by coordinating the actions of multiple stakeholders. 
In contrast, in a crowdsourced process for sustainability standard development, the 
standard-setting organization does not select those which stakeholders will be engaged in the 
process. Instead, individual stakeholders make the decision of whether to engage in developing a 
specific standard. The perceived legitimacy of a crowdsourced process is tied to how inclusive 
the process is, or the degree to which any stakeholder is free to engage in the standard 
development process (Christensen, Karjalainen, & Nurminen, 2015). Thus, the standard-setting 
organization has a legitimacy-seeking incentive to promote widespread engagement in the 
aggregate, but lacks the ability to choose which stakeholders are engaged and does not play a 
coordinating role in helping multiple stakeholders work together to create a specific standard. 
Thus, because the standard-setting organization does not select or coordinate between 
stakeholders in crowdsourced standard development, and stakeholders themselves bear the 
coordination costs of working with others, the stakeholder engagement patterns that lend 
legitimacy to a closed source process (including multiple stakeholders, those that are already 
perceived to be legitimate, or stakeholders with divergent perspectives) are less likely in a 
crowdsourced standard development. Thus, we argue: 
H1: The average number of stakeholders involved in generating a sustainability standard 
will be lower in crowdsourced standard development processes than closed-source 
processes. 
H2: The likelihood of involving government, university and non-profit stakeholders in 
generating a sustainability standard will be lower in crowdsourced standard 
development processes than closed-source processes. 
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H3: The likelihood of involving cross-sector combinations of stakeholders in generating 
a sustainability standard will be lower in crowdsourced standard development processes 
than closed-source processes. 
 
Stakeholders’ knowledge also influences which stakeholders are engaged in the two 
different types of standard development. Large and well-established private sector actors central 
to an industry typically have access to closed source standard development systems (Heinz & 
Laumann, 1982; Scott, 2008). Large and established organizations, due to their size and prior 
history, are more easily recognized by those viewing the standard development process from the 
outside. Research has shown that humans often make decisions, such as determining the 
legitimacy of a process, using a recognition heuristic, which simply ascribes positive properties 
to objects that are more recognizable (Hertwig & Herzog, 2009). This cognitive heuristic is 
largely based in reality. Incumbent firms, non-profit organizations, and other governmental 
bodies typically are larger and have more resources (Zott & Huy, 2007). They also have 
established reputations and tend to have higher status (Mishina, Block, & Mannor, 2012). New 
organizations, on the other hand, do not have a track record and are often considered illegitimate 
(Aldrich & Ruef, 2006). By involving organizations that are more recognizable, a standard-
setting organization can increase perceptions of the legitimacy of the process of developing 
standards for measuring sustainability and also access useful knowledge.  
In contrast, crowdsourced processes allow any stakeholder to be involved in standard 
development. As discussed previously, the freedom of any stakeholder to be involved in the 
crowdsourced process of standard development fosters perceptions of legitimacy. This self-
selection into involvement in the crowdsourced system will lead to differences in engagement 
patterns, relative to selection by the standard-setting organization involved in the closed source 
system of standard development, which would focus on the most reputable potential participants. 
Thus, we argue:  
H4: The likelihood of involving new organizations in generating a sustainability standard 
is higher in crowdsourced standard development processes than closed-source processes. 
Variety in Innovation 
Thus far, we have focused our arguments on the legitimacy tradeoffs between closed source and 
crowdsource systems for developing sustainability standards. We now turn to tradeoffs related to 
knowledge of stakeholders participating in the development of the standards. In a closed source 
system, the standard-setting organization must make decisions about where to focus. This 
requires prioritization on the part of the standard-setting organization in applying limited 
resources to areas deemed most important and excludes avenues deemed less important. Yet, 
there is rarely complete agreement on the most appropriate path towards increasing sustainability 
(Zald & McCarthy, 1990).  
In contrast, a crowdsourced system broadens search for different approaches to 
measuring sustainability by allowing any stakeholder to unilaterally work on developing new 
sustainability standards. While the individual stakeholder must bear the costs of developing a 
new standard, a crowdsourced process allows parallel experimentation, thus increasing the 
number of options that can be considered simultaneously. In a consensus-based closed source 
system of standard development, negotiation between multiple parties tends to narrow quickly to 
a few alternatives. Different perspectives involved in a closed source process help to avoid 
creating standards that might not be practical. This means that a closed source standard 
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development process based on consensus-making is more likely than a crowdsourced system to 
ignore some options that could effectively meet societal needs. The differences in access to 
knowledge between the two systems illustrates a basic trade-off between avoidance of costly 
mistakes and access to informational variety (Csaszar, 2012). 
In a crowdsourced standard creation system, peripheral actors are able to create standards 
that are closely aligned with their ideals and possibly conflicting with the prevailing perspective 
of powerful actors. Without such inclusion, a narrower set of standards (those in line with 
powerful actors’ perspectives) are likely to be considered and approved. Based on these 
arguments, we propose:  
H5: Crowdsourced standard development processes will be more likely to generate 
higher variety in sustainability standards than closed-source processes. 
As we argued previously, older and larger stakeholders are more likely to be selected to 
be involved in developing a new standard in a closed source system. Stakeholders that are more 
established and have social connections built through years of operation are more likely to 
occupy a more central position in the industry’s knowledge structure. Thus, a standard developed 
through a closed source system is more likely to represent the core of an industry. In contrast, the 
stakeholders that are allowed greater access through a crowdsourced system of standard 
development (e.g. younger, smaller) are also likely to be on the periphery of an industry’s 
knowledge structure, as well as different from other relevant stakeholders. Their lack of 
similarity enables peripheral stakeholders to create radical innovation that changes the system 
(Henderson & Clark, 1990). As with other types of radical leaps forward, however, the 
likelihood of success is low. Thus, a crowdsourced process of standard development is more 
likely to involve stakeholders with the potential for revolutionary change, but whose ideas may 
have limited practicability, or the ability to be feasibly be implemented under current conditions.  
While standard-setting organization may be skilled at checking the basic fit between the 
proposed standard and objectives of a broader collective, they are often not in the position to 
know how well a standard address collective needs (Koch, 2011). Thus, it is difficult in a 
crowdsourced system of standard development to assess the practicability of a proposed 
standard. Moreover, standard-setting organizations must maintain the perception of legitimacy 
that is derived from allowing freedom to participate in the process of standard development. 
Thus, it is difficult for the standard-setting organization to reject a proposed standard based on 
low practicability as long as the standard does not actually violate legal or procedural principles. 
Thus, we argue: 
H6: The likelihood of developing sustainability standards with low practicability 
will be higher with crowdsourced standard development processes than closed-
source processes. 
 
METHOD 
Data Sources 
We gathered both qualitative and quantitative data concerning the development of carbon offset 
measurement standards, which are one type of sustainability standard. More familiar 
sustainability standards classify products (as either meeting or not meeting the standard) 
according to a set of minimum requirements (e.g. fair trade, organic food, etc). Carbon offset 
measurement standards involve minimum requirements as well as designate processes for 
consistently quantifying greenhouse gas reductions originating from a carbon offset project. We 
relied on interviews with over 40 industry professionals, many of whom were involved in 
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creating carbon offset measurement standards (Dutt, 2011; Levin, 2011) to improve our 
understanding of the standard creation process in each carbon system. This qualitative work 
helped to uncover differences between the two systems. However, we rely more heavily on 
quantitative archival data to illustrate key differences in stakeholder engagement and adoption of 
standards.  
We gathered data on the stakeholders who were involved in the creation of each carbon 
offset measurement standard in the CDM and CAR. In each case, we identified the specific 
stakeholders that were involved in creating the proposed standards, as well as the outcomes of 
the process. In some instances, a proposed standard failed at some point in the standard creation 
process to be approved. In others, the standard gained approval, and was later used (to widely 
varying degrees) as the basis for specific carbon offset projects. In the CDM, we gathered this 
data from two sources. The UNFCCC website provides extensive data on all proposed and 
approved measurement standards (the CDM uses the term methodologies). This data includes: 
the date of submission, the approval decision of the UNFCCC, the text of the methodology, and 
the identity of the methodology author. The UN Risoe Center was our second CDM data source; 
it extracted important details on each proposed and approved methodology from the UNFCCC 
website and made it available in its “CDM Pipeline” data (Fenhann, 2013). In the case of any 
missing data, we supplement this information from the UNFCCC website. Data on the 
development of standards (called protocols) in the CAR were obtained directly from the CAR 
website (“Climate Action Reserve,” 2011). The CAR website includes documentation of existing 
protocols, protocol development milestones, dates of issuance, a list of the stakeholders involved 
in developing the protocol. 
These data sources allowed us to assemble a list of all the stakeholder organizations 
involved in developing each carbon offset measurement standard in both the CDM and CAR 
systems. We gathered each stakeholder organization’s year of founding and organization type 
(for-profit firm, non-profit organization, or university/governmental agency) through a search of 
various online sources. We report university and government organizations in a combined 
measure since it is often difficult to distinguish whether an organization housed at a university is 
really a government entity or controlled by the university. These included: the CDM Bazaar 
website (established by the UNFCCC), Orbis’ online database of private companies, company 
web pages, and LinkedIn profiles of company founders. In cases where we could not find the 
needed information online, we used e-mail and phone numbers listed in project documents to 
contact the organization to ask its country of origin and founding year. In each case we 
documented the source of this information. 
 Based on the above data, we generate the following variables for use in our empirical 
analyses regarding the nature and extent of stakeholder engagement in generating proposed 
carbon offset measurement standards. Our analysis is at the level of the individual carbon offset 
measurement standard, which allows for comparison between carbon offset markets of much 
different sizes as shown in Table 2. First, a 0/1 indicator of whether a particular approved or 
proposed standard was generated in the CAR standard development system (car). Second, a 
variable that identifies the number of stakeholder organizations engaged in developing in a 
proposed standard (stakeholders). Third, variables that indicate the proportion of stakeholders 
participating in each proposed standard that is associated with different types of stakeholder 
organizations: Government/University (govuniv), Nonprofit or Voluntary Association 
(nonprofit), and For-profit (forprofit), and start-ups (startup). We use proportions rather than 
counts because the total number of stakeholders engaged in standard-development varies 
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between standards. Fourth, an indicator of whether a given proposed standard involved 
stakeholders across sectoral boundaries (crossector). Fifth, an indicator of the percentage of 
stakeholders that are repeat participants in the standard development process, scaled by the total 
number of prior participants (repeaters). We also generate a variable that represents the average 
founding year of each stakeholder participant organization as an alternative measure of the 
newness of organizations. Variables were generated as follows: a proposed standard that 
involved one for-profit stakeholder organization and one government stakeholder organization 
(neither of which were new organizations or repeat participants) would have a value of 2 for 
stakeholders, values of 0.5 for each of govuniv and forprofit, a value of 1 for crossector, and a 
value of 0 for nonprofit, repeaters, and startup.  
We also generate usage statistics for approved standards (210 in CDM and 13 in CAR). 
We count the number of times each approved standard is implemented in other carbon projects 
(adoption rate-continuous), as well as a binary indicator of whether a particular standard was 
used beyond the first project it was associated with (adoption-0/1). We look at whether or not a 
carbon offset standard is ever adopted as an indication of its practicability. To more fully test the 
degree to which a standard has very little practicability to other stakeholders, we test the 
difference between the systems in the levels of standards with no adoption (standard was 
approved), but not ever used by a carbon offset project. 
RESULTS 
Relying on the data described above, we now perform preliminary tests of our theoretical 
hypotheses, using simple regressions and mean difference tests. Our first hypothesis is 
that, on average fewer stakeholders will be engaged in the development of a sustainability 
standard in a crowdsourced process of standard development than in a closed source 
process. The data seem to support this hypothesis. Table 3 reports that the average CDM 
standard involves just 1.29 stakeholders, while the average CAR standard involves 12.08 
stakeholders (p<0.001).  
--- INSERT TABLE 3 HERE --- 
Our second hypothesis is that, on average, a crowdsourced sustainability standard 
will involve fewer government and nonprofit stakeholder in the development process 
than will closed sourced standard-development. The data suggest support for this 
hypothesis. Table 3 reports that the average CDM stakeholder involved in standard 
development is less than half as likely to be a government and university participant as 
the average CAR stakeholder (9% versus 25%, p<.01). Similarly, the nonprofit 
participant likelihood is consistent with our theoretical prediction—4% for CDM, 12% 
for CAR (p<.01). If we look at the likelihood that a given stakeholder participant is a for-
profit firm, the differences are even more striking. CDM stakeholders are considerably 
more likely to come from a for-profit organization than are CAR stakeholders (87% 
versus 63%, p<.001).  
 Our third hypothesis is that, on average, a crowdsourced sustainability standard 
will involve less cross-sector stakeholder engagement in the development process than 
will a standard developed through a closed sourced process. The data seem to support this 
hypothesis. Table 3 reports that, on average, 12% of CDM proposed standards and 46% 
of CAR proposed standards involve cross-sector relationships (p<.001). This finding 
could be driven by the relatively high number of CDM standards (373) that involved only 
a single stakeholder group in the development process, so we recalculated (in unreported 
analysis) the difference in means test based on those proposed projects that include two 
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or more stakeholder groups. The differences between the two groups lessened (51% and 
88%, respectively, p<.01), but the results remained consistent with those in Table 3, 
suggesting consistent support. 
Our fourth hypothesis is that, on average, a crowdsourced sustainability standard 
will involve more new stakeholder engagement in the development process than closed 
sourced standard-development. The data seem to support this hypothesis. Table 3 reports 
that, on average, CDM stakeholder participants are almost twice as likely to be startups 
(founded post-2000) than are CAR stakeholder participants (29% versus 16%, p<0.1). 
Additionally, the average founding year of CDM participants is 1981, versus 1964 for 
CAR stakeholder participants (p<.01). 
Our fifth hypothesis is that crowdsourced standard-development will generate more 
variety in standards than closed sourced standard-development. The data support this hypothesis. 
CDM stakeholders are less likely than are CAR stakeholders to be repeat participants in the 
standard-setting process (1% versus 3%, p<.001), suggesting a greater flow of unique knowledge 
and information and a deviation from the existing core of knowledge, supporting our hypothesis 
that crowdsourced standard development is associated with increased variety. 
Our sixth and final hypothesis is that, on average, crowdsourced standard-
development will generate a higher likelihood that standards have lower practicability 
than will closed sourced standard-development. The data seem to support this hypothesis. 
The data suggest that any given standard is much less likely to be used in CDM than 
CAR (21% versus 69%, p<.001). We also find similar results in Table 4 using a logistic 
regression model with a single predictor variable—CAR—which is negatively associated 
with the likelihood that an approved standard will be utilized at all (coef=2.13, p<.001). 
These results together suggest that crowdsourced development processes result in higher 
likelihood of less practicable standards than do more closely coordinated closed-source 
standard development processes.  
--- INSERT TABLE 4 HERE --- 
DISCUSSION  
The process by which carbon offset measurement standards were developed in two different 
carbon markets provides insights for the future development of sustainability standards in other 
contexts. It seems clear that just as multiple carbon markets can co-exist, multiple overlapping 
sustainability standards can co-exist. Yet, the nature and extent of engagement by stakeholders is 
influenced by the need to access requisite knowledge as well as the need for the system to be 
perceived as legitimate (Gilbert et al., 2011). We found that, relative to CAR (a closed source 
system), on average, a carbon offset measurement standard developed in the CDM (a 
crowdsourced system) involves fewer stakeholders, and fewer non-profit and 
government/university organizations, but more new organizations. Our hypotheses regarding 
variety of standards and the likelihood of creating standards with low subsequent use were only 
partially supported.   
Our first four hypotheses address the differences in stakeholder engagement. Based on 
our findings, some contexts might favor a crowdsourcing approach. One example might include 
contexts in which established organizations dealing with a social problem are not perceived as 
legitimate or contexts in which efforts to deal with a social problem suffer from a prior history of 
exclusion or otherwise poor governance. Such a history would suggest that stakeholders might be 
overly suspicious about the ideas and proposed standards developed by “experts” chosen by a 
standard-setting organization, greatly decreasing the perceived legitimacy of the standards 
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development process and end results. A crowdsourcing approach permits a stakeholder to 
unilaterally engage in standard development, which may help overcome a history marked by 
exclusion of some types of stakeholders. This is one of the concerns that drove the particulars of 
the CDM’s approach to including developing country firms and governmental entities; 
developing nations bear a disproportionate share of the climate change burden but have 
historically lacked power in setting global policy agendas (Repetto, 2001).  
Our fifth hypothesis discusses the relative ease of generating new ideas from a 
crowdsourced process, including identification of standards which would have been difficult for 
a closed-source process to identify and incorporate. For example, CDM standards were created 
for carbon emission reductions created by solar powered cable cars, energy-free water purifiers, 
biogas from alcohol wastewater, and biodiesel from Jatropa and Pangamia seeds. These 
standards were likely considered and approved only because of the vast diversity of viewpoints 
coming from different industries and different countries that is allowed in a crowdsourced 
process. In domains where it is clear that a variety of approaches are needed, a crowdsourced 
system is likely more appropriate. Examples of this situation include contexts with lower 
consensus on the approaches to sustainability measurement or multiple processes for measuring, 
communicating or auditing sustainability in a particular domain. In contrast, a high level of 
consensus on basic approaches to sustainability standards or widely adopted processes for 
creating such standards make it easier to identify the most appropriate stakeholders to participate 
in closed source standard-development, with fewer legitimacy concerns.  
Our final hypothesis relates to relative adoption rates of standards created in these two 
systems. Because closed source processes allow resources to be concentrated on the development 
of a smaller number of proposals for sustainability standards (reducing the risk of developing 
measurement standards with low practicability), a closed source process might be more 
beneficial in a context where the cost (in money or time) to develop or review a proposed 
measurement standard is very high. Conversely, given the high number of standards with low 
adoption rate in a crowdsourced standards-development process such as the CDM, it is difficult 
to recommend crowdsourcing standards in a particular context unless stakeholders have a very 
significant interest in internalizing the cost of developing new standards, such as in the carbon 
market where the effort to develop a standard tends to help an organization seeking to develop 
more carbon offset projects.  
Contributions 
Our paper contributes to several areas of research. First, we provide a conceptual framework that 
helps to explain why different stakeholders are involved to different degrees in different systems 
of sustainability standard development. We agree with others that sustainability standards are 
crucial for collective achievement of increased global sustainability (Rawhouser, Cummings, & 
Newbert, forthcoming). And these advances are likely to require innovation, not only in 
technology and organization, but in standards that help to direct organizational activities 
(Orlikowski & Scott, 2013). We draw on innovation management research to describe two 
alternative approaches for involving stakeholders in sustainability standard development. Our 
work aligns well with prior research that has developed typologies of multi-stakeholder 
initiatives. However, our identification of crowdsourcing as an alternative method for such 
initiatives is an exciting avenue that future research could consider in developing how 
stakeholders can be involved in the standard development process.  
While we have theorized more generally about the development of sustainability 
standards, we have focused specifically on carbon offset measurement standards. The ability to 
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empirically observe the development of many different sustainability standards, under differing 
stakeholder engagement processes, is an important strength of this study. Both the closed source 
and crowdsourced systems for standard development that we have featured represent a middle 
ground between Kroeger and Weber’s (2014) “big tent” approach to generating standards that 
seek to span across contexts and social issues, and other approaches to measurement which are 
fully idiosyncratic to an organizational context or industry (Cuesta-Gonzalez, Munoz-Torrez, & 
Fernandez-Izquierdo, 2006). We believe that in this middle ground, individuals, organizations 
and their stakeholders that have an interest in a specific social or environmental problem can 
collectively work together to develop ways to quantify progress toward their shared goals.  
We also add to work on private regulation and other private sector governance activities. 
This research has largely focused on making the case that boundaries between business, society, 
and government are increasingly blurred (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Vogel, 2008) or that these 
blurred boundaries have increased the political roles of the private sector and changed 
relationships between a firm and its stakeholders (i.e. Mena & Waeger, 2014). Our paper’s 
theoretical exploration of stakeholder engagement in the development of sustainability standards 
deepens our understanding of one way in which private actors assume a quasi-governmental role 
and suggests implications for different frameworks facilitating private sector involvement in 
measuring and generating sustainability.  
Limitations 
Despite the contributions outlined above, we also recognize our study has limitations. We have 
looked at what types of stakeholders are involved in developing sustainability standards and the 
degree to which these standards are used. However, we are not in a position to judge whether 
these standards actually lead to increases in sustainability. Indeed, some researchers have 
questioned the usefulness of carbon offsets in achieving sustainability goals (MacKenzie, 2009; 
Stechemesser & Guenther, 2012). Moreover, sustainability standards may shift resources toward 
projects or initiatives that can more easily be measured, rather than those that are the most 
impactful. If this is true, the significant expense of measurement may be wasted. Moreover, we 
show that different types of stakeholders are involved in different systems for sustainability 
standard development. However, given our research limitations we are unable to know whether 
this variability in engagement leads to variance in sustainability outcomes. In short, although our 
paper addresses issues of effective stakeholder engagement in a sustainability context, we cannot 
say if one system (crowdsourced vs closed source) is better than another at achieving its stated 
environmental goals. 
Our research setting also has some limitations. First, the carbon markets are unique and 
innovative in so many ways that one might wonder whether lessons from these markets can be 
extrapolated to the question of how to collectively develop sustainability standards. Second, 
there may be other factors aside from crowdsourced versus closed-source processes we 
identified, which may also contribute to our empirical results. These include differences in 
geographic scope (North America vs entire developing world) and organizing goals (emission 
reduction vs. emission reduction and economic development) between the two systems. 
Additional empirical observation, and perhaps formal modeling, may help to further validate our 
findings regarding inclusivity of stakeholder engagement.  
Lastly, we have not fully addressed the initial costs of developing measurement systems 
and the ongoing costs of measurement that are required. Development of a detailed sustainability 
standard is a time-consuming and expensive process. Monitoring costs are particularly high in 
project-based systems like the CDM (Koch, 2011; Levin, 2011). Tremendous time and other 
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resources have been invested in creating the infrastructure of standards for calculating and 
verifying carbon offsets, and these standards are based on scientific laws that have relatively 
widespread consensus. Costs may be even higher in domains that are less consensus-based. 
Although our paper is a helpful elucidation of some standard development tradeoffs, it does not 
explicitly address the systemic efficiency of generating comparable sustainability standards. We 
leave that task to future research.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This study set out to theorize and empirically test how variation in stakeholder 
engagement patterns can influence the process and outcomes of sustainability standard 
development. Our quantitative comparative investigation in two different carbon markets shows 
that standard-setting organizations can engage stakeholders in crowdsourced as well as closed 
sourced processes of sustainability standard development, and that these system design choices 
influence which stakeholders are involved as well as the degree to which standards are used. We 
hope that this paper will prompt further investigation of stakeholder engagement in the 
development of sustainability standards.
                                                 
1 A stakeholder may apply to participate in standard development, but this participation is at the discretion of the 
standard-setting organization. 
2 In later years CAR allowed the private sector to submit project concept suggestions, which would then be reviewed 
internally.  
3 CAR maintains a dialogue with stakeholders, such that stakeholders can indicate interest in participating in 
development of a specific standard. However, CAR still decides which stakeholders will participate. 
4 Except for minor revisions, new proposals are required for modifications to an existing CDM standard. 
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Table 1: Comparison of closed-source and crowdsourced stakeholder engagement 
processes 
 
Characteristic Closed Source Stakeholder 
Engagement Process 
Crowdsourced Stakeholder 
Engagement Process 
Standard-Setting 
Organization (SSO) 
Involvement 
Extensive. Sets objectives, 
chooses stakeholders, 
manages decision-making. 
Limited. Sets up system and 
provides guidelines, has final 
approval authority.  
Stakeholder 
participation 
Selected. Work to come to 
consensus with other 
stakeholders on standard. 
Self-select into process, 
develop standard unilaterally. 
Search and 
evaluation process  
Consensus-based search and 
evaluation.  
Individual stakeholder-driven 
search, SSO evaluation.  
Basis for perceived 
Legitimacy 
Stakeholder participation 
pattern (stakeholders 
perceived to be legitimate, 
achieve consensus). 
Freedom of participation (all 
are free to participate as 
standard developers). 
Costs of standard 
development  
Costs often borne by SSO. 
Costs borne by participating 
stakeholders are shared. 
Initial costs borne by 
participating stakeholders. 
Costs of reviewing proposed 
standards borne by SSO . 
The above table compares key elements and differences between closed-source and 
crowdsourced mechanisms of stakeholder participation in development of sustainability 
standards 
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Table 2: Comparison of CDM and CAR development of carbon offset standards, 2003-2012 
 
Characteristic Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) 
Climate Action Reserve 
(CAR) 
Structure  Crowdsourced: bottom-up 
from stakeholder participants 
Closed source: top-down from 
standard-setting organization 
Geographic scope 104 countries 2 countries (US and Mexico) 
Number of standards  482 proposed  
210 approved 
24 proposed  
13 approved 
System Size 10858 unique carbon projects 252 unique carbon projects 
The above table contains a summary of some case-specific comparisons between our two carbon 
markets  
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Table 3. Mean Comparisons by Carbon Market  
Panel A. Stakeholder Participation in Developing Proposed Carbon Offset Standards 
 CDM (n=482) CAR (n=24) t-test  Mean SD Mean SD 
stakeholders (#) 1.29 (0.60) 12.08 (13.19) -17.93*** 
govuniv (%) 0.09 (0.25) 0.25 (0.24) -3.03** 
nonprofit (%) 0.04 (0.16) 0.12 (0.18) -2.69** 
forprofit (%) 0.87 (0.30) 0.63 (0.34) 4.41*** 
crosssector (%) 0.12 (0.32) 0.46 (0.51) -7.35*** 
startup (%) 0.29 (0.43) 0.16 (0.28) 1.37+ 
foundingyear 1981.99 (32.67) 1964.84 (18.71) 2.54** 
repeater (%) 0.01 (0.03) 0.03 (0.05) -4.72*** 
      
Panel A above reports means, standard deviations (in parentheses), and F-statistics of various types of stakeholder 
participation in developing proposed standards. ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, +p<.10  
 
Panel B. Adoption of Approved Carbon Offset Standards 
 CDM (n=210) CAR (n=13) t-test  Mean SD Mean SD 
adoption rate (count) 53.48 (341.22) 19.38 (33.21) ns 
adoption (0/1) 0.21 (0.41) 0.69 (0.48) -4.10*** 
Panel B above reports means, standard deviations (in parentheses), and F-statistics of various adoption rates of 
approved standards. ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, +p<.10 
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Table 4. Regression of Standard Use and Adoption by Carbon Market 
 (1) 
NBReg 
Adoption rate (count) 
(2) 
Logit 
Adoption (0/1) 
CAR -1.01 2.13*** 
 (1.46) (0.63) 
Obs 223 223 
 
Table 4 above reports coefficients, robust standard errors (in parentheses). 
Column 1 models the number of times each approved standard is implemented, 
estimated using a negative binomial regression. Column 2 models the likelihood 
that any given standard is used more than once, and is estimated using a logistic 
regression model. ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, +p<.10 
 
